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The dilemma of holding prosecutors accountable while ensuring their independence 
was at the center of the debates surrounding the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court.2 The drafters of the Rome Statute for the ICC understood that the Court would be 
handling cases with significant political implications and yet working with limited resources 
and no independent enforcement capacity. To enhance prosecutors’ ability to operate 
successfully in this environment, the drafters enshrined prosecutorial independence into the 
Statute and gave prosecutors significant discretion over charging and investigation decisions. 
At the same time, drafters worried that ICC prosecutors were not sufficiently accountable to 
anyone. This led to the decision to give judges and the Assembly of States Parties a limited 
authority to oversee prosecutorial actions.  
The concern about accountability initially focused on prosecutors’ decisions about which 
situations to investigate, which persons to indict, and what charges to bring. But as the ICC 
began proceedings in its first case, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, it soon confronted prosecutorial errors 
and misconduct relating to procedural matters—e.g., the duties to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence, to follow court orders, and to comply with human rights law in the 
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gathering of evidence.3 The Trial Chamber attempted to fashion a response. But its reaction was 
at times too drastic and threatened to derail the proceedings in Lubanga. The Court’s 
predicament revived debates about the tradeoffs between prosecutorial accountability and 
other legitimate goals of the international criminal justice system. Over time, judges came to 
acknowledge that sweeping remedies, while protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial, may 
disproportionately harm other important public values, including deterrence, retribution, and 
the establishment of an accurate historical record.4  
As prosecutorial failings surfaced, some also called for stronger non-judicial 
mechanisms to police the process. The Assembly of States Parties created its own subsidiary 
body, the Independent Oversight Mechanism, to investigate misconduct among prosecutors. 
But the Assembly’s intervention was seen by many as compromising the principle of 
prosecutorial independence and creating the risk that politics would influence disciplinary 
decisions. The Office of the Prosecutor insisted that the Statute entrusted it—and not the 
Assembly—with the primary responsibility to police misconduct among its members.5    
This debate highlights the need for a more comprehensive evaluation of existing and 
proposed mechanisms of ensuring prosecutorial accountability at the ICC. These include 
internal bureaucratic controls within the Office of the Prosecutor, judicial intervention, and 
disciplinary measures by the Assembly of States Parties, the Independent Oversight 
Mechanism, and national or international bar associations. Internal controls are critical and 
should be developed further, but they are not a sufficient response to the problem of 
misconduct. External mechanisms remain an important backstop and can help encourage the 
development of stronger and more effective internal oversight.  
Among the several external mechanisms, judges remain best situated to police 
prosecutorial misconduct, at least in the near future. But judicial actions are not a perfect 
solution—they are often too blunt and provide a windfall to defendants at the expense of 
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legitimate interests of international criminal justice. Judges also do not have the resources to 
investigate every alleged ethical violation or misconduct by prosecutors. In the long term, the 
ICC must develop a broad disciplinary framework that makes greater use of non-judicial 
mechanisms of accountability, such the Assembly of States Parties, the Independent Oversight 
Mechanism, and perhaps an international professional association such as the International 
Association of Prosecutors. These organizations offer distinct types of accountability—along 
political, administrative, and professional dimensions—which could serve as an important 
complement to judicial remedies and sanctions. 
Prosecutorial conduct can also be influenced more subtly through informal sanctions by 
fellow prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Because the ICC is a diverse community with 
fewer shared norms and fewer repeat interactions between the lawyers and judges, the effect of 
informal sanctions by professional peers is likely to be somewhat less meaningful at the 
international than at the national or local level. For several reasons, however, it is nonetheless 
important to discuss informal sanctions. They are imposed quickly and efficiently, without the 
need for an extensive investigation into the circumstances surrounding the misconduct. They 
are also less likely to frustrate the ability of the ICC to continue proceedings in the case affected 
by the misconduct.  Over time, as the ICC legal community becomes more established, they are 
also likely to be a more potent and useful complement to formal sanctions.6 
In addition to punishing misconduct after it occurs, the ICC must strengthen its 
preventive programs in this area. As a critical step in that direction, the Office of the Prosecutor 
has recently adopted a Code of Conduct for its members.7 The Office has also committed to 
developing more regular training programs concerning professional conduct and instituting 
more rigorous internal oversight for line prosecutors.8 To the extent that the Office falls behind 
in this task, ICC judges can provide encouragement, both formally and informally. Two recent 
decisions in Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, one calling on the OTP to adopt a Code of Conduct and 
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another urging the Office to change its methods of reviewing documents for disclosure, suggest 
that judges are willing to take on this important responsibility.9  
Within the first ten years of the Court’s existence, judges have taken firm measures in 
policing procedural violations by prosecutors. They have affirmed the Court’s commitment to 
the rule of law and fair trials, while remaining sensitive to competing interests of international 
criminal justice. The ICC must do more to develop non-judicial mechanisms to police 
prosecutorial misconduct, and the debate surrounding the establishment of the Independent 
Oversight Mechanism suggests that such mechanisms must be structured in a way that 
preserves the independence and effectiveness of ICC prosecutors. As judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms of accountability develop, it is also important to establish guidelines to coordinate 
among them. 
I. Balancing Accountability and Effectiveness 
The Rome Statute proclaims that the ICC’s central mission is “to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of [international crimes] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes.”10 Retribution and deterrence are therefore central goals of the Court. But like other 
international criminal courts, the ICC also strives to achieve broader goals, such as producing 
an accurate record of the events it adjudicates.11 The Court also pursues expressive and didactic 
goals, aiming to model a commitment to human rights and the rule of law for national 
jurisdictions to follow.12  
                                                 
9 ibid. 
10 ICC Statute pmbl. 
11 E.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
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International prosecutors play an essential role in helping the ICC accomplish these 
goals. They select the cases and charges that they believe would best advance the Court’s 
objectives, and they conduct the investigations necessary to support the cases in court. Because 
of their considerable discretion in the process, international prosecutors are considered “the 
driving force of all international criminal tribunals.”13   
While ICC prosecutors have ample legal discretion to select cases and charges, they 
remain constrained by the intensely political environment in which they operate. The crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction typically concern powerful political or military actors who are 
likely to resist investigations. Domestic authorities are (by definition under the Statute’s 
admissibility requirements) unwilling or unable to prosecute the cases that are presented to the 
Court. Yet because ICC prosecutors have no independent law enforcement capacity, they 
depend heavily on these same domestic authorities for investigations. At the same time, ICC 
prosecutors operate with limited resources drawn from member state contributions, and they 
“must, as a matter of necessity, be extremely selective in deciding which cases to investigate . . . 
.”14 This challenging environment demands not merely legal acumen, but also a great deal of 
diplomatic savvy on the part of international prosecutors.15  
 Understanding this political background, the framers of the ICC inscribed the value of 
prosecutorial independence into the Statute. Article 42 provides that the “Office of the 
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court” and that its members “shall 
not seek or act on instructions from any external source.”16 The drafters of the ICC Statute 
viewed these guarantees of prosecutorial independence as an essential precondition for the 
Court’s ability to accomplish its various goals. Freedom from political interference would allow 
                                                                                                                                                             
524; Jens David Ohlin, ‘A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law’ (2009) 14 
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14 Louise Arbour, ‘Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice’ (1997) 21 Fordham Intl LJ 531; see also 
Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime (CUP 2005); 
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15 Côté (n 13) 322; see also Carla del Ponte and Chuck Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's Worst 
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16 ICC Statute, art. 42. 
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prosecutors to pursue cases impartially, based above all on legal merit, and would thus ensure 
the long-term political legitimacy of the Court.17 
At the same time, ICC framers understood that prosecutorial discretion must be 
controlled at least to some degree in order to prevent abuse and injustice.18 In domestic systems, 
prosecutors are held accountable through a variety of external mechanisms, including the 
democratic process, professional discipline boards, civil service disciplinary frameworks, and 
judicial supervision.19 Several of these mechanisms are either unavailable or only minimally 
available at the international level. ICC prosecutors are not embedded in a broader democratic 
political system, they are not members of an international bar association (sometimes not even a 
national bar association20), and they are not part of a civil service hierarchy that extends beyond 
the Court. The drafters of the ICC Statute therefore had to experiment with new models of 
prosecutorial accountability and to rely more heavily on judicial supervision than might be 
expected in a domestic criminal justice system. At the same time, some state representatives 
wanted to include some type of political check on the prosecution, and this led them to entrust 
the Assembly of States Parties—a political body composed of ICC member state representatives 
and possessing quasi-legislative functions—with a limited power to discipline prosecutors for 
serious misconduct.  
Both judicial and political oversight of prosecutorial actions at the ICC must contend 
with the dilemma between accountability and effectiveness. Judges can respond to 
prosecutorial misconduct with powerful sanctions and remedies, including dismissals, retrials, 
and the exclusion of evidence, which could effectively end a case. Through the imposition of 
such remedies, judges can affirm the ICC’s commitment to the rule of law and fair trials.21 At 
the same time, case-determinative remedies inflict serious costs on other objectives of 
international criminal justice, including the Court’s primary goal of preventing impunity for 
international crimes. Judicial oversight must grapple with the tension between these goals. 
                                                 
17 See Côté (n 13) 322. 
18 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Accountability and Ethics’ in Luc Reydams et al. (eds.) International Prosecutors (OUP 2012) 416, 
418. 
19 Wright and Miller (n 2) 1600-09; Tonry (n 2).  
20 See infra text accompanying note 108. 
21 Turner (n 1) 205-06. 
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Likewise, political oversight by the Assembly of States Parties can come into conflict 
with prosecutorial independence. Most obviously, this can occur when the Assembly launches 
an investigation into prosecutorial actions in order to interfere with a prosecution that 
Assembly members oppose on political grounds. Even when such blatant manipulation is not at 
issue, regular inquiries into prosecutorial activity can undercut legitimate prosecutorial efforts. 
A prosecutor who has to account for each and every one of his acts can quickly cease to be 
effective.22 Prosecutors who are routinely forced to respond to inquiries must divert scarce time 
and resources from their work of developing and presenting cases. More broadly, the prospect 
of investigations can deter certain socially desirable actions by prosecutors and diminish the 
zeal with which they pursue cases. The Court cannot tolerate arbitrariness and injustice by 
prosecutors, but at the same time, accountability must not “be so pervasive as to defeat the 
purpose of having an independent Prosecutor.”23  
II. Internal Oversight 
Relying on the Rome Statute’s provisions on prosecutorial independence, the Office of 
the Prosecutor has argued that internal oversight is the most appropriate means of regulating its 
staff. In support of this position, the Prosecutor has referred to the general provision that its 
staff members should act independently and not on external instructions, as well as to Article 
42(2), which vests the Prosecutor with “full authority over the management and administration 
of the Office, including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof.”24 The ICC Staff Rules 
and Regulations likewise contemplate that members of the Office of the Prosecutor would be 
disciplined for “unsatisfactory conduct” primarily through an internal administrative process.25 
                                                 
22 Mégret (n 18) 418. 
23 ibid. 
24 ICC Statute art. 42(2). 
25 Staff Regulations of the International Criminal Court art. X; Staff Rules of the International Criminal Court, Rule 
110.1; Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02, Decision on the Defence Application Concerning Professional 
Ethics Applicable to Prosecution Lawyers ¶12 (May 31, 2013) (“As the Staff Regulations make clear, the authority to 
impose disciplinary measures on Prosecution staff for misconduct lies primarily with the Prosecutor.”). Allegations 
of unsatisfactory conduct are to be reviewed by a Disciplinary Board, which consists of one member appointed by the 
Prosecutor, one by the Registrar, and one by the staff representative body. Staff Rules of the International Criminal 
Court, Rule 110.3. The Board’s decision is not binding on the Prosecutor, however. The Prosecutor also has the 
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Unsatisfactory conduct is broadly defined and includes “failure to observe the standards of 
conduct expected of an international civil servant.”26 
Administrative sanctions imposed within the Office of the Prosecutor are most likely to 
be effective in addressing individual misconduct by line prosecutors. At the domestic level, 
internal discipline is already used widely to police prosecutors in civil-law countries and is 
increasingly seen as key to reducing prosecutorial misconduct in the United States.27 Internal 
sanctions work well because they are imposed directly on those prosecutors responsible for the 
violations and take the form of punishments that prosecutors care about—for example, salary 
reductions, suspensions, demotions, and even termination. If imposed consistently, such 
punishments send a clear message about the importance of following the rules of the court. In 
addition, internal mechanisms such as training and oversight programs play a critical role in 
preventing misconduct in the first place.28 In all these ways, the Office of the Prosecutor can take 
concrete and effective measures to foster a culture of respect for the rule of law among its staff. 
The Office already appears to have a hierarchical structure with clear lines of control and 
several levels of oversight, which would indicate the basic infrastructure for internal oversight 
is present.29 But anecdotal accounts also suggest that the Office could do more to train and 
regularly audit its personnel in proper investigative and disclosure procedures. The recent 
failure to identify and disclose potentially exculpatory evidence in the Kenyatta case confirms 
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reviewed by the Board. Ibid Rule 110.8.  
26 Staff Rules of the International Criminal Court, Rule 110.1. 
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these accounts.30 As others have argued persuasively, it is also important for the Office to 
promulgate a detailed Code of Conduct to guide its prosecutors.31  
Responding to these concerns, the Office recently adopted a Code of Conduct.32 It also 
commissioned a study to examine its supervision practices and has committed to reform in this 
area.33 Finally, the Office has pledged to institute more regular and comprehensive training 
programs for its members.34 By strengthening its internal oversight mechanisms, the Office can 
bolster its argument that external investigations, such as those by the IOM, should be limited. 
Credible internal discipline will also generally help improve the Office’s reputation with judges 
and with the international community. Maintaining a strong reputation with these two 
constituencies is critical to ICC prosecutors’ ability to function effectively.  
Even an effective internal oversight program does not entirely eliminate the need for 
external monitoring, however. First, internal discipline will not work when the violation of the 
rules is condoned or ignored by supervisors. The main violations that occurred in the Court’s 
first case, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, did not concern errant line prosecutors, but involved a 
fundamental disagreement between the Office of the Prosecutor and the judges about how to 
interpret the Rome Statute. In cases where the defendant has been seriously harmed by the 
misconduct, moreover, internal discipline will typically not be sufficient to repair the injury. 
While in-house efforts have a role to play, it remains critical for the ICC itself to develop a 
robust approach to policing prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
III. Judicial Oversight 
                                                 
30 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and 
Related Requests ¶¶ 93-94 (Apr. 26, 2013). 
31 Milan Markovic, The ICC Prosecutor's Missing Code of Conduct, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 201 (2011). The Office of the 
Prosecutor has, however, issued regulations that cover many questions pertaining to professional conduct. See 
International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009). It is also 
revising its policies and Operations Manual and planning to “clarify operational processes, reporting lines, and 
responsibilities.” Townsend (n 29) 294. 
32 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor (Sept. 5, 
2013). 
33 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan, June 2012-2015, at 33 ¶¶ 77-84 (Oct. 11, 2013). 
34 ibid. ¶¶ 74, 57. 
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The ICC Statute vests judges with the primary authority to police prosecutorial conduct 
that may harm the integrity of the proceedings. In response to misconduct, judges can exclude 
evidence, order compensation to the accused, give warnings to the prosecution, impose fines, 
and interdict prosecutors from the courtroom.35 Over time, the Court has developed several 
other responses to misconduct by relying on its “inherent” powers, its authority to ensure the 
fairness of the trial, and its duty to ensure that the Statute’s provisions are read in conformity 
with human rights law.36 These include conditional and unconditional stays of the proceedings, 
orders to release the accused, and adverse inferences from the evidence. 37 They even extend to 
prophylactic measures, such as orders for the Office of the Prosecutor to implement specific 
measures to prevent misconduct from recurring.38  
The Court has also gradually shifted its approach from one that focuses strictly on the 
prejudice to the defendant and the integrity of the proceedings to one that considers broader 
competing interests in determining the appropriate remedies for misconduct. The first two 
decisions in which the Court took a more absolutist approach to remedies concerned the failure 
                                                 
35 ICC Statute arts. 69(7), 71, 85. The Court can also exercise jurisdiction over offenses against the administration of 
justice under Article 70, but it is not entirely clear from the Statute and the Rules who would investigate and 
prosecute such offenses when the suspected offender is a member of the Office of the Prosecutor. Ibid art. 70; compare 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/06, Prosecution’s Observations on Article 70 of the Rome Statute (Apr. 
1, 2011) (prosecution brief arguing that the prosecution is exclusively responsible for prosecuting such offenses) with 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/06, Observations de la Défense sur la mise en oeuvre de l’Article 70 
(Apr. 1, 2011) (arguing that when the prosecution has a conflict of interest, the Trial Chamber can ask the Registrar to 
appoint an amicus curiae to conduct the prosecution). 
36 See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) 
and Related Requests ¶¶ 89-90 (Apr. 26, 2013); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on 
the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the 
Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status 
Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 17 (June 13, 2008); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment 
on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 37 (Dec. 14, 2006). 
37 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the 
Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 17 (June 13, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials 
Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with 
Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶¶ 41, 55 (Oct. 21, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the 
Proceedings,” ¶ 212 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
38 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and 
Related Requests ¶¶ 89-90, 97 (Apr. 26, 2013). 
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to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence before trial and the refusal to obey court orders to 
disclose the identity of an intermediary who had worked for the prosecution.  
In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, several months before trial, prosecutors informed the Trial 
Chamber that they had discovered more than two hundred documents containing potentially 
exculpatory evidence or evidence material to the defense.39 Prosecutors maintained that they 
could not disclose the documents to either the defense or the Chamber, because the documents 
had been obtained under confidentiality agreements. The sources that had supplied the 
documents to the prosecution—the United Nations and several non-governmental 
organizations—had refused to grant consent for any disclosure, even to the court.40 Prosecutors 
maintained that that they were acting in good faith and had repeatedly tried to obtain consent 
to disclose the documents.41 While acknowledging that the prosecution was acting in good faith, 
the Trial Chamber emphasized that the prosecution had violated the accused’s fundamental 
right of access to exculpatory evidence. By collecting much of its evidence under broad 
confidentiality agreements, which prevented even the Trial Chamber from reviewing the 
evidence in camera, the prosecution laid the foundation for the conflict between confidentiality 
and disclosure.42 Because the judges could not ensure a fair trial without first reviewing the 
evidence to determine its materiality, they decided to stay the proceedings indefinitely and 
order the release of the defendant.43 
After an intervention by the Appeals Chamber and a change of course by information 
providers, who finally consented to the disclosure of the documents to the Trial Chamber, the 
proceedings resumed.44 Soon after the trial began, however, the Lubanga Trial Chamber imposed 
                                                 
39 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the 
Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 17 (June 13, 2008). 
40 ibid ¶ 64. 
41 ibid ¶ 17. 
42 ibid ¶ 75. 
43 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 30 (July 2, 
2008). 
44 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 13 
(Jan. 23, 2009). The prosecution obtained the consent after assuring the providers that the Chamber would treat the 
documents as confidential (an assurance that the Chamber had given much earlier in the process and before the 
initial stay) and after promising that it would take all protective measures necessary, including withdrawal of the 
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a second stay of the proceedings.45 The prosecution had deliberately refused to comply with the 
Chamber’s order to release the identity of an intermediary whom the prosecution had used to 
contact witnesses in the DRC.46  The prosecution argued that it could not comply with the order 
because disclosure of the person’s identity might jeopardize his safety and would conflict with 
the prosecution’s duty to protect witnesses.47  The Trial Chamber noted, however, that it had 
ordered the disclosure of the person’s identity only after consulting the ICC’s Victims and 
Witnesses Unit about the necessary protective measures.48  The prosecution’s deliberate refusal 
to follow the court order meant that the prosecutor declined “to be ‘checked’ by the Chamber.”49  
The Chamber concluded that there was no realistic prospect of a fair trial under the 
circumstances, so it again stayed the proceedings and ordered the release of the defendant.50 
In both Lubanga decisions, the combination of the stay and order to release, if actually 
implemented, would have effectively ended the case. If the defendant had in fact been released, 
it would have been unlikely that the Court would have been able to regain custody of him. The 
judges suggested in passing that they were aware of the potential significant costs of their 
orders—to the international community, which created the ICC to punish and deter 
international crimes; to victims, who would not receive a remedy for the wrongs they suffered; 
and to the Court’s own goal of uncovering the truth.51 But the judges deliberately chose to set 
aside these competing social and legal interests and instead focused solely on the seriousness of 
the procedural violation.52 They refused to consider whether less burdensome remedies might 
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50 ibid. 
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be available to address the misconduct, and by effectively dismissing the case, opted for what 
one might call an absolutist approach to remedies.53 
While these first two decisions by the Lubanga Trial Chamber might suggest that the 
Court would take a very strict and uncompromising line on prosecutorial misconduct, more 
recent pronouncements by both Trial and Appeals Chambers indicate that the Court is adopting 
a more measured approach. When the Appeals Chamber reviewed the first decision to stay the 
proceedings in Lubanga, for example, it recognized the need to leave open the possibility for the 
trial to proceed. The Appeals Chamber re-characterized the stay as “conditional” and reversed 
the order to release the defendant.54 The re-categorization of the stay allowed the Court to reach 
the merits of the case once the prosecution was able to obtain consent to disclose the documents 
to the Chamber.55  
The Appeals Chamber embraced the balancing approach more openly two years later, 
when it overturned the second stay of proceedings in Prosecutor v. Lubanga. It held that the Trial 
Chamber should first consider less drastic measures, such as sanctions against the prosecutor, 
before ordering a stay of the proceedings.56 Because an indefinite stay of proceedings imposes 
significant costs on the ICC’s ability to fulfill all of its purposes, it should be used only in the last 
resort. In concluding that a stay was not appropriate under the circumstances, the Appeals 
                                                 
53 See Madhav Khosla, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?: A Reply’ (2010) 8 Intl J Const L 298 
(contrasting balancing and absolutist approaches to human rights). 
54 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials 
Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application To Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with 
Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 1008,” ¶¶ 4–5 (Oct. 21, 2008); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I 
Entitled “Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,” ¶¶ 44–45 (Oct. 21, 2008). 
55 The prosecution obtained the consent after assuring the providers that the Chamber would treat the documents as 
confidential (an assurance that the Chamber had given much earlier in the process and before the initial stay) and 
after promising that it would take all protective measures necessary, including withdrawal of the charges, in the 
event the Appeals Chamber were to order the disclosure of documents without the providers’ consent. Rastan (n 44) 
275–76 n 42. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of 
Proceedings, ¶ 13 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
56 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 Entitled “Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the 
Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively Stay Proceedings Pending Further 
Consultations with the VWU,” ¶ 61 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
14 
 
Chamber expressly considered the interests of victims and of the international community “to 
see justice done,” as well as the interest of the accused in a final decision on the merits.57 
Since then, Trial Chambers in several cases have rejected defense motions to stay the 
proceedings and have emphasized the need to seek less costly corrective measures.58 In Lubanga, 
for example, the defense requested a permanent stay to remedy several prosecutorial failures, 
including the failure to verify certain witness statements and the failure to supervise several 
intermediaries who had allegedly bribed prosecution witnesses.59   The Trial Chamber 
concluded that even if these allegations of misconduct were true, a remedy less drastic than a 
stay could cure the prejudice at issue. At the conclusion of the case, the Trial Chamber would 
review the instances in which the prosecution might have been submitting unreliable evidence, 
and it would weigh or exclude evidence as necessary.60 In deciding whether to impose a stay, 
the Chamber noted that it “must weigh the nature of the alleged abuse of process against the 
fact that only the most serious crimes of concern for the international community as a whole fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Court.”61  
The Trial Chamber applied a similar balancing approach to remedies in Prosecutor v. 
Kenyatta.62 In that case, the prosecution failed to disclose a potentially exculpatory witness 
statement until after the hearing to confirm the charges had concluded. The omission resulted 
from a deficient review system within the Office of the Prosecutor where “persons without 
knowledge of the overall state of the evidence against the accused, or at a minimum the overall 
                                                 
57 ibid ¶ 60. 
58 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a 
Permanent Stay of the Proceedings,” ¶ 197 (Mar. 7, 2011); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision 
on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ¶ 77-78 (Apr. 26, 2013) (reviewing more 
recent cases and concluding that “[i]t is clear from the more recent jurisprudence of the Court that not every violation 
of fair trial rights will justify the imposition of a stay (conditional or unconditional) of the proceedings and that this is 
an exceptional remedy to be applied as a last resort”). 
59 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a 
Permanent Stay of the Proceedings,” ¶ 196 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
60 ibid ¶ 204. 
61 ibid ¶ 195. 
62 ibid ¶ 189. Although a stay guarantees the enforcement of fundamental rights, it also has significant costs: “It 
brings proceedings to a halt, potentially frustrating the objective of the trial of delivering justice in a particular case as 
well as affecting the broader purposes expressed in the preamble to the Rome Statute.” ibid ¶ 165. 
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evidence provided by the witness concerned,” reviewed documents for disclosure.63 The 
defense therefore received the document only after it had requested the prosecution to provide 
more information about it.64 
The Trial Chamber noted that the prosecution’s failure to turn over the document was “a 
cause for serious concern, both in terms of the integrity of the proceedings and the rights of Mr. 
Kenyatta.”65 But it noted that the document was ultimately disclosed before trial, even if 
belatedly. The Chamber also emphasized that there was no evidence of bad faith on part of the 
prosecution and that the prejudice caused by the late disclosure could be cured at trial, where 
the defense would be able to challenge the credibility of the evidence.66 For these reasons, the 
Chamber concluded that it would be disproportionate to stay the proceedings.67 Instead, the 
Chamber reprimanded the prosecution and required it to conduct a complete review of its case 
file and “certify to the court that it has done so in order to ensure that no other materials in its 
possession that ought to have been disclosed to the Defense, are left undisclosed.”68 The 
Chamber stressed that it expected the prosecution, “if it had not already done so, to make 
appropriate changes to its internal procedures.”69 While imposing relatively mild sanctions on 
the prosecution—a mere reprimand, the Chamber left open the possibility that the sanctions 
might escalate if a similar disclosure problem were uncovered as the case progressed.70 
This most recent decision concerning prosecutorial misconduct illustrates three positive 
developments in the Court’s approach toward prosecutorial misconduct. First, it confirms the 
Court’s commitment to policing prosecutors for errors and misconduct. As in earlier decisions 
in Lubanga and Katanga, ICC judges have actively assumed the responsibility to address 
                                                 
63 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and 
Related Requests, ¶ 93 (Apr. 26, 2013). Even though other prosecutors from the Office conducted further interviews 
with the witness, requested authorization from a judge to withhold the affidavit, and reviewed the evidence 
provided by the witness when preparing for the confirmation hearing, no one noticed the potentially exculpatory 
nature of the statement. ibid. 
64 ibid ¶ 94. 
65 ibid ¶ 95. 
66 ibid ¶ 96. 
67 ibid ¶ 97. 
68 ibid.  
69 ibid. 
70 ICC Trial Chambers have also taken different approaches to the remedy of excluding evidence—in some cases 
using a balancing approach and in other cases using an absolutist approach. For a more detailed discussion of these 
two different approaches to excluding evidence, see Turner (n 1) 192-94, 199-203. 
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procedural violations by prosecutors and have not deferred disciplinary questions to internal 
mechanisms within the Office of the Prosecutor or to the Assembly of States Parties. Given the 
current weakness of these other mechanisms, judicial activism in addressing misconduct is 
generally a positive development, even when it occasionally results in overly burdensome 
remedies. 
Second, the Kenyatta decision builds on the line of cases that have adopted a structured 
balancing approach to remedies. Following this approach, the Trial Chamber acknowledges that 
providing relief to defendants, while important for vindicating fair trial rights, can impair the 
Court’s ability to achieve other goals, such as punishing international crimes and compiling an 
accurate historical record.71 The Court is transparent and forthright about the considerations 
that motivate its decision, allowing a more fruitful debate about its merits.72 Significantly, by 
enumerating the specific factors that guide its balancing analysis, the Kenyatta Chamber is 
providing much-needed structure and predictability to the balancing approach developed in 
earlier ICC decisions.73  
Finally, the Kenyatta decision further expands the range of remedies and sanctions for 
prosecutorial misconduct. The Court had previously done so on several occasions by reading 
broadly its authority to ensure the fairness of the proceedings and its duty to interpret the Rome 
Statute consistently with international human rights. By reprimanding prosecutors and 
threatening more serious sanctions unless prosecutors implement a specific plan to reform their 
disclosure practices, the Kenyatta Chamber has further diversified the remedies available to the 
Court. As the Court adds to the palette of remedies and sanctions provided under the Statute, it 
helps ensure that it can offer more proportionate and targeted responses to misconduct. Going 
forward, the Court can build on this record and introduce two important additional remedies—
sentence reductions and dismissals of select counts, which have been used effectively in other 
                                                 
71 Turner (n 1) 204-09. But cf. Kelly Pitcher, ‘Addressing Violations of International Criminal Procedure’, in D. Abels et 
al. (eds.), Dialectiek van Nationaal en Internationaal Strafrecht (Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2013) 257-308. 
72 Turner (n 1) 211-12. 
73 The early decisions on prosecutorial misconduct offer some indication of what factors may be relevant. These 
include the prejudice to the defendant’s rights, the culpability of the prosecutor, and the level of involvement by the 




international criminal tribunals and a number of national jurisdictions. These remedies have the 
virtue of allowing the trial on the merits to proceed, while still effectively punishing errant 
prosecutors and vindicating individual rights.74  
These first decisions by ICC Chambers have shown that, in many cases, judges are both 
legally and practically well-situated to respond to prosecutorial misconduct. They are often the 
first witnesses to misconduct and are able to address it promptly and directly. At the same time, 
judges do not have unlimited time or resources to investigate and sanction prosecutorial 
misconduct. Their investigative capacity is especially likely to be insufficient when it comes to 
systemic misconduct by the Office of the Prosecutor or when the misconduct does not directly 
threaten the integrity of the proceedings. This is one reason why additional political and 
administrative measures remain necessary to police prosecutorial misconduct adequately. In 
addition, even when judges are able to impose remedies that effectively punish misconduct, 
these remedies are often too blunt and may interfere with other goals of the international 
criminal justice, including the goal to punish and deter international crimes effectively. Judicial 
mechanisms therefore remain an imperfect response to prosecutorial misconduct, and political 
and administrative mechanisms are still necessary to address misconduct effectively.  
IV. Political Oversight 
Political accountability of prosecutors is a common feature of domestic criminal justice 
systems. Common-law countries have applied it as a check on prosecutorial discretion for a 
long time, and civil-law countries occasionally use it to supplement bureaucratic mechanisms of 
accountability.75 Yet the idea of holding prosecutors accountable through political institutions 
remains controversial at the ICC. Commentators fear that oversight by a political body such as 
the Assembly of States Parties would undermine the ability of prosecutors to accomplish their 
                                                 
74 ibid 215-37. The Court could also broaden the use of sanctions, such as fines and interdiction, to respond to 
misconduct. Ibid. 232-38. In Kenyatta, the Trial Chamber referred to its “broad discretionary powers to ensure a fair 
trial” as a basis for imposing sanctions for breaches of its orders even when the breach did not occur during the 
proceedings, as Article 71, pertaining to sanctions, appears to require. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-
02/11, Decision on the Defence Application Concerning Professional Ethics Applicable to Prosecution Lawyers ¶ 14 
(May 31, 2013). 
75 Wright and Miller (n 2) 1590-91. 
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tasks impartially and effectively. The concern is that the political implications of cases are often 
too immense—and the prosecutorial role in them too central—to allow for disinterested action 
by Assembly delegates when it comes to policing prosecutors.  
While these concerns are not entirely without merit, the ICC Statute explicitly provides 
for Assembly oversight in several provisions concerning the appointment, removal, and 
discipline of the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor and provisions concerning the management 
of the Office of the Prosecutor.76 In addition to textual support for Assembly oversight, there is 
also a policy argument for it. Given the frequently mentioned “democratic deficit” of the ICC, 
some level of oversight by the Assembly may help the Court gain a measure of political 
legitimacy (at least with those member states that see political accountability of prosecutors as a 
virtue).77 Finally, even if the concerns about political interference by the Assembly are valid as a 
theoretical matter, they are not likely to be borne out regularly in practice. The Assembly’s 
disciplinary powers are already legally and practically so circumscribed that we are more likely 
to see a problem of insufficient discipline rather than overzealous inquiries for political ends.  
The Assembly of States can act by majority to elect, remove, or discipline the ICC 
Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor. Disciplinary measures range from reprimands to fines and 
removal. The Assembly can remove the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor for gross negligence 
in the performance of their duties, for knowingly acting in contravention of their duties, and for 
serious misconduct that is “incompatible with official functions, and causes or is likely to cause 
serious harm to the proper administration of justice before the Court or the proper internal 
functioning of the Court.”78 The Assembly can fine or reprimand the Prosecutor and Deputy 
                                                 
76 ICC Statute, arts. 46, 47, 112. 
77 See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, ‘Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal 
Court’ (2007) 39 NYU J Intl L & Pol 583, 657; Allison Marston Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability 
of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 97 AJIL 510, 535. For an analysis of the different 
attitudes toward political accountability of prosecutors in civil-law and common-law countries, see Darryl K. Brown, 
Law, Democracy, and Structures of Adjudication (manuscript on file with author); Tonry (n 2). 
78 ICC Statute, art. 46; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 24(1)(a). An example of serious misconduct is the 
disclosure of information that the Prosecutor has acquired in the course of her duties or on a matter which is under 
consideration by the court “where such disclosure is seriously prejudicial to the judicial proceedings or to any 
person.” ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 24(1)(a)(i). The other two examples involve serious misconduct for 
personal benefit. Specifically, “(ii) Concealing information or circumstances of a nature sufficiently serious to have 
precluded him or her from holding office;” and “(iii) Abuse of judicial office in order to obtain unwarranted 
favourable treatment from any authorities, officials or professionals.” 
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Prosecutor for less serious misconduct that “causes or is likely to cause harm to the proper 
administration of justice before the Court or the proper internal functioning of the Court.”79 As 
an example, repeatedly “failing to comply with or ignoring requests made by the Presiding 
Judge or by the Presidency in the exercise of their lawful authority” qualifies as such 
misconduct.80  
The broad language of these provisions lends some credence to the concern that the 
Assembly may use discipline for political reasons (for example, when a majority of states 
believes that a prosecutor is mishandling a sensitive case). But a layer of procedural constraints 
sharply limits the odds of misuse. First, any complaint about prosecutorial misconduct must be 
transmitted to the Presidency of the Court before it is sent to the Assembly for consideration. A 
board of three judges reviews the complaints and sets aside anonymous or manifestly 
unfounded complaints.81 Only after such complaints are filtered out does the Presidency 
forward the remaining ones to the Assembly.82  
It is still theoretically possible that complaints that are not “manifestly unfounded,” but 
are also not entirely legitimate, can be used to harass top prosecutors and frustrate their work. 83 
Yet other statutory provisions set additional limits on Assembly intervention in most cases of 
misconduct. First, measures by the Assembly can be imposed only on the Prosecutor and the 
Deputy Prosecutor. At least for now, judicial responses remain the only external source of 
accountability for line prosecutors.84 Even with respect to misconduct by the two top 
prosecutors, the Assembly’s ability to respond is procedurally constrained. The Assembly meets 
regularly only once a year, and during that sole meeting it must decide on a number of 
important budgetary and management questions pertaining to the Court as a whole. The 
Assembly is not likely to devote its limited time to disciplinary measures except in 
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extraordinary cases. Disciplinary measures also require an absolute majority vote in the 
Assembly of States Parties, which is a high threshold to cross.85  Under these procedural 
constraints, the Assembly is likely to address only egregious misconduct by top prosecutors. 
The more realistic prospect is therefore that the Assembly would provide weak oversight, and 
judicial oversight will remain the backstop for most instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Although the Assembly is not likely to discipline prosecutorial misconduct frequently, 
its authority to do so overlaps to some degree with judicial authority to police prosecutorial 
misconduct. To ensure that the Assembly and judges use their disciplinary powers efficiently, it 
is important to delineate more clearly when each body should intervene. In determining how to 
divide responsibility for different types of misconduct, the ICC may consider the following 
three factors: 1) the relative expertise of each body in investigating the specific type of 
misconduct at hand; 2) the relative ability of each body, with respect to the type of misconduct 
at issue, to impose sanctions that effectively punish misconduct, affirm the rule of law, and 
promote fair trials; 3) the relative burden that judicial and Assembly interventions might 
impose on the ability of the ICC to accomplish its central purposes, such as preventing impunity 
for international crimes and ascertaining the truth about the crimes.  
With respect to the last factor—the cost of the measures imposed—reprimands and fines 
by the Assembly fare relatively well. Reprimands and fines do not alter the result of judicial 
proceedings and do not directly undermine the goals of punishing international crimes and 
uncovering the truth. In many cases, therefore, they represent a superior alternative to judicial 
remedies that disrupt the course of the case, such as a stay of proceedings, dismissal, or 
exclusion of evidence. On the other hand, reprimands and fines provide no concrete relief for 
violations of individual rights, and the Assembly is not well-suited to determining when such a 
violation has occurred. Accordingly, a reprimand or fine by the Assembly would not be a useful 
substitute for judicial remedies when the violation at issue has harmed individual rights. They 
would be more appropriate for violations that have not prejudiced individual rights, yet are 
significant or pervasive enough to warrant a response. 
                                                 
85 The Assembly can call special sessions by a vote of a third of its members or on the initiative of its Bureau, but this 
adds yet another procedural threshold. ICC Statute art. 112(6). 
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In some cases, the Court could also refer to the Assembly cases of misconduct that have 
affected individual rights or the integrity of the proceedings and for which the Court has 
already imposed some remedies. Because remedies are costly, the Court could impose more 
measured remedies but then refer a case for further discipline by the Assembly (at least where 
the misconduct can be attributed to the Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor). The judicial referral 
could help overcome the procedural hurdles to Assembly action and reduce the risk of 
politicization. At the same time, by combining milder judicial remedies with Assembly 
sanctions, the Court could achieve the desired punitive effect at a lesser cost to the proceedings 
on the merits.86  
V. Administrative and Professional Oversight 
A. Independent Oversight Mechanism 
Perhaps in recognition of its limited practical ability to discipline prosecutors directly, 
the Assembly of States Parties recently created an Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM) to 
investigate misconduct by prosecutors, judges, court staff, and contractors retained by the 
court.87 The IOM is not yet fully operational but is expected to begin work in the near future. 
The IOM would have the power to investigate misconduct by prosecutors and recommend 
disciplinary measures to the Office of the Prosecutor.88 Where criminal conduct is suspected, it 
                                                 
86 Milder remedies may include a sentence reduction, adverse evidentiary inference, or reprimand. Even when 
combined with Assembly sanctions, however, these remedies would not be appropriate when prosecutorial 
misconduct has undermined confidence in the verdict. See Turner (n 1) 182. 
87 The ASP established the Mechanism under Article 112(4) of the ICC Statute, which provides that: “The Assembly 
may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism for 
inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in order to enhance its efficiency and economy.” ICC Statute, 
art. 112(4). Some commentators have questioned whether the authority to discipline a wide range of prosecutorial 
misconduct can be based on this grant of competence to enhance the “efficiency and economy” of the court. The 
Proposed Independent Oversight Mechanism for the International Criminal Court, Invited Experts on Oversight 
Question, UCLA Law Forum, (May-Sept. 2011), at http://uclalawforum.com/home (contribution by Nicholas 
Cowdery). 
88 A.S.P. Res., Establishment of an Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/8/Res.1, ¶ 6(d) (Nov. 26, 2009). In a 
more recent resolution, adopted as this book chapter was going through the editing process, the ASP expanded the 
IOM’s function to include unscheduled inspections of “any premises or processes” of the Court, as requested by the 
Bureau of the ASP. A.S.P. Res., Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/12/Res.6, Annex, ¶ 6 (Nov. 27, 2013). 
The new functions will also include “evaluation of any programme, project or policy as requested by the Assembly or 
Bureau.” ibid ¶ 16.  
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could recommend that the Court refer the matter to the relevant national authorities.89 
Misconduct is interpreted very broadly and includes “any act or omission . . . in violation of [the 
staff member’s] obligations to the Court pursuant to the Rome Statute and its implementing 
instruments, Staff and Financial Regulations and Rules, relevant administrative issuances and 
contractual agreements, as appropriate.”90 It does not, however, include offenses against the 
administration of justices, such as presenting false testimony and interfering with witness 
testimony, which are covered by Article 70 of the ICC Statute and remain subject to prosecution 
by the Office of the Prosecutor and trial by the Court.91 
The Oversight Mechanism is presented by the Assembly as an independent 
administrative body that would hold ICC prosecutors to account in order to ensure the effective 
functioning of the Court. The Assembly grounded its authority to establish the IOM on two 
provisions of the Rome Statute. Article 112(2)(2) provides that the Assembly “shall . . . provide 
management oversight to . . . the Prosecutor . . . regarding the administration of the Court.”92 To 
do so, under Article 112(4), “the Assembly may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be 
necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and 
investigation of the Court, in order to enhance its efficiency and economy.” 93 
 The Office of the Prosecutor has objected to the Assembly’s competence to establish the 
Independent Oversight Mechanism and has argued that IOM investigations into prosecutorial 
misconduct would interfere with the principle of prosecutorial independence enshrined in 
Article 42 of the Rome Statute.94 According to the OTP, if an external body such as the IOM 
were to “instruct” or demand cooperation from prosecutorial staff without the consent of the 
Prosecutor, it would violate the Rome Statute’s language that prosecutors “shall not seek or act 
on instructions from any external source.”95 Because the Statute also provides that the 
Prosecutor has “full authority over the management and administration of the Office, including 
                                                 
89 ibid ¶ 41. 
90 ibid ¶ 28 n.4. 
91 ibid ¶ 30. 
92 ICC Statute art. 112(2)(2). 
93 ICC Statute art. 112(4). 
94 ICC Statute, art. 42 (providing that “[t]he Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the 
Court” and that “[a] member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source”). 
95 Report of the Bureau on the Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/9/31, ¶ 44 (Nov. 29, 2010). 
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the staff, facilities and other resources thereof,” the Prosecutor has argued that he enjoys “full 
and unfettered administrative independence” to investigate and discipline his own staff.96 
 In view of the Prosecutor’s objections, the Assembly of States Parties revised the IOM’s 
procedures twice. The first amendment provided that whenever the ICC Prosecutor and the 
IOM disagree as to whether investigations of prosecutorial staff should proceed, an 
independent third-party would be brought in to resolve the dispute.97 If the third party 
determined that the investigation might undermine prosecutorial independence, the 
investigation would be suspended. Even after this amendment was adopted, however, concerns 
remained that the IOM’s investigations could be used by the Assembly to interfere with the 
independence of the ICC Prosecutor.98 Commentators suggested that states parties unhappy 
with charging decisions of the Prosecutor might use the oversight mechanism to harass the 
Office of the Prosecutor, prevent the Office from devoting full attention to prosecutions, and 
place pressure on the prosecutor to change her policies.99 To some degree, these concerns were 
accommodated through the recourse to an independent third party and the requirement that 
investigations be conducted “with strict regard for fairness and due process for all 
concerned.”100 But it was still unclear what exact procedures the IOM would adopt to ensure 
due process and confidentiality and how independent the third-party arbiter would in fact be 
(since it would be appointed by the Assembly of States Parties, some observers worried that its 
independence may not be entirely assured).101  
 In its most recent session, the Assembly revised the IOM procedures once more. This 
time, it provided that the IOM must notify the Prosecutor of any pending investigation of a staff 
                                                 
96 ibid. The submissions to the Bureau on this issue were signed by then-Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo. The most 
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member and then consult with the Prosecutor within five working days of the notification, “in 
order to avoid any negative impact on on-going investigative, prosecutorial and judicial 
activities resulting from the proposed investigation.”102 If following the consultation, the 
Prosecutor continues to believe that the proposed investigation is outside the mandate of the 
IOM, the Prosecutor can report its concerns to the Bureau and then seek a determination from 
the Presidency of the ICC.103 The President of the Court will be assisted by three judges in 
issuing a final and binding judgment on this matter. 
The most recent amendment minimizes the risk that the IOM would interfere with 
legitimate prosecutorial actions. In an earlier writing on this topic, I had proposed that IOM 
procedures be revised to require that any complaints about prosecutorial misconduct relating to 
investigative and trial work be referred or at least vetted by ICC judges.104 Such a mechanism 
already exists with respect to complaints of misconduct transmitted to the Assembly for 
disciplinary measures under Article 46. I therefore argued that the same mechanism for 
complaints to the IOM would be practical and consistent with the existing legal framework. The 
judicial referral mechanism could prevent politically motivated investigations of prosecutors 
from occurring, but would still allow valid complaints to be investigated by the IOM. The 2013 
Assembly Resolution provides for a similar judicial check on IOM inquiries, but it requires the 
Prosecutor to trigger the procedure by seeking a determination from the Presidency. This new 
procedure appears to strike a good balance between the need to preserve prosecutorial 
independence and yet ensure accountability. 
Even if the judicial referral mechanism addresses the concern about the IOM’s potential 
politicization, another problem remains. The current structure of the IOM includes only four 
staff members. It was increased from the earlier provision for only two members, but the 
mandate of the IOM was also extended to cover inspections and evaluation of ICC programs 
more broadly.105 Given that the IOM is supposed to inspect and evaluate ICC programs and 
then also investigate complaints concerning prosecutors, judges, the Registrar, staff members of 
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the Court, and contractors, a four-member office seems inadequate to the task. Unless the IOM’s 
capacity is expanded, the Mechanism is likely to have only a limited role to play in monitoring 
ICC prosecutors. In addition to these resource constraints, as noted earlier, the IOM is also 
legally limited to investigate misconduct other than offenses against the administration of 
justice.106 Therefore, the real problem with the IOM may be that it would provide insufficient, 
rather than overzealous scrutiny of prosecutorial misconduct. 
  In light of its currently limited resources, the IOM would do best to direct its efforts to 
cases where it is likely to have the most impact and where other sanctions and remedies are 
insufficient. For example, the IOM could usefully investigate complaints alleging that 
prosecutors knowingly or purposefully engaged in misconduct, but the defendant was not 
directly or seriously harmed. Similarly, investigations would be helpful where the prejudice to 
an individual defendant is minor, but there is a pattern of misconduct by the Office of the 
Prosecutor. In such cases, the court may be reluctant to impose any meaningful remedies, 
because the harm to an individual defendant is small. Action by the IOM would therefore be 
critical to holding prosecutors accountable and deterring future violations. As with disciplinary 
measures by the Assembly, it would be useful to delineate the instances in which IOM action 
would be more beneficial than judicial intervention. 
B. Bar Associations 
Because of the various shortcomings of discipline by the Assembly of States Parties and 
the IOM, some have suggested that bar associations could be used to regulate international 
prosecutors. Bar associations have the authority to investigate and discipline prosecutorial 
misconduct in common-law systems, and at least in theory, they offer a fair and efficient way to 
handle misconduct. They are composed of prosecutors’ professional peers and can draw on 
members’ legal expertise to address questions of misconduct competently; they are generally 
seen as neutral and apolitical bodies; and their disciplinary measures have no direct effect on 
the outcome of ongoing cases. But as commentary on bar discipline at the domestic level has 
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shown, in practice, such discipline is rarely imposed, and it has failed to constrain prosecutorial 
misconduct effectively.107  
At the ICC, regulation by bar authorities is even less likely to work, for several reasons. 
First, ICC prosecutors are not required to be members of a national bar association, and at least 
some current prosecutors appear to lack such membership.108 Unless the Office of the Prosecutor 
begins requiring membership as a matter of policy, local bar associations could not offer 
comprehensive regulation. A bar membership requirement is not likely to be forthcoming, 
however, because prosecutors from civil-law countries are typically not regulated through their 
bar associations. They are seen as organs of the court and members of the civil service, on par 
with judges, and are disciplined either through internal administrative measures, or, for more 
serious violations, by civil service tribunals.109  
Another potential problem is that national bar associations may not always apply their 
codes of conduct extraterritorially.110 Even when rules do apply across borders, national bar 
authorities would be reluctant to conduct expensive and logistically challenging investigations 
of misconduct abroad.111 If national authorities are already failing in their duties to discipline 
prosecutorial misconduct at home, it appears implausible that they would consider inquiries 
into misconduct at the ICC a high priority.  
Even if we were to assume that some enforcement by local authorities would occur, 
another problem remains. As debates about witness proofing, ex parte contacts, and cross-
examination at the international criminal courts have shown, norms of conduct still differ 
significantly across jurisdictions. Depending on the choice-of-law rules applied by local bar 
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associations, ICC prosecutors may be subject to different norms of conduct, creating a problem 
of inconsistent treatment. In fact, even if the choice-of-law rules consistently directed national 
bar associations to apply ICC rules,112 a problem of expertise in interpreting and applying these 
rules would likely arise. Moreover, choice-of-law provisions typically do not apply to 
procedural and evidentiary matters, so the problem of different treatment would still remain to 
a certain degree.  
In response to these concerns, some have suggested that an international professional 
body, such as the International Association of Prosecutors (“IAP” or “Association”), ought to 
play a more central role in sanctioning ICC prosecutors.113 But at least at present, the IAP has 
not assumed any disciplinary role and has limited itself to drafting a model code of conduct for 
ICC prosecutors.114 It is not at all clear that relevant actors at the ICC would wish to see a more 
active role for the Association. The Assembly of States Parties decided to create an oversight 
mechanism under its own auspices instead of entrusting the IAP with the task of disciplining 
prosecutors. 
Requiring international prosecutors to join an international association such as the IAP 
and giving it investigative authority over prosecutorial misconduct would have certain benefits. 
Regulation by an international association would provide greater uniformity in the standards 
governing prosecutorial actions compared to regulation by national bar associations. Compared 
to oversight by the IOM and the Assembly of States Parties, it would also present a lesser risk 
that disciplinary measures would be used for political ends. Finally, the Association would 
draw on the expertise of prosecutors from different legal systems, including some with 
international experience, ensuring that discipline is imposed with a good understanding of the 
context in which international prosecutors operate.  
Despite these potential benefits of IAP oversight, it is not likely to be the optimal means 
of accountability for prosecutors at the ICC in the foreseeable future. The Association is not an 
                                                 
112 Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 8.5(b)(1) (“[F]or conduct in connection with a matter pending before a 
tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise.”). 
113 Mégret (n 18) 465; see also James G. Stewart, New Thoughts About Barayagwiza: Reactions to Policing International 
Prosecutors, NYU JILP Symposium, Opinio Juris, Apr. 5, 2013, at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/05/nyu-jilp-
symposium-new-thoughts-about-barayagwiza-reactions-to-policing-international-prosecutors.  
114 Markovic (n 31) 205. 
28 
 
organ of the Court, and it might be difficult to reconcile its oversight functions with the Rome 
Statute. The creation of the Independent Oversight Mechanism further reduces the appeal of 
transforming the IAP into a regulatory body for ICC prosecutors. Regulation by both the IAP 
and the IOM would be duplicative and inefficient. In choosing between the two oversight 
mechanisms, ICC prosecutors would likely prefer the IAP because of its perceived neutrality, 
expertise, and distance from the Assembly of States Parties. But the Assembly would prefer to 
rely on the mechanism it has already created, and it is not clear that the Rome Statute gives the 
Office of the Prosecutor the authority to override that preference. Finally, some civil-law 
prosecutors working at the ICC, who identify above all as organs of the Court, might be 
reluctant to be regulated by an external professional association. For all these reasons, the IAP is 
unlikely to take on disciplinary duties with respect to ICC prosecutors, at least in the 
foreseeable future. 
C. Informal Sanctions 
A less obvious mechanism of regulating the conduct of international prosecutors 
includes informal sanctions by other prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.115 Such 
sanctions can be imposed promptly and efficiently as they do not require an extensive 
information gathering process or an elaborate procedure before judgment.116 While they are 
milder in effect than most formal sanctions, informal measures are likely to be imposed more 
frequently because they are relatively economical. The speed with which they can be levied 
adds to their deterrent effect. Such sanctions are especially effective in tight-knit legal 
communities, in which lawyering norms are broadly shared and prosecutors’ careers depend 
heavily on their reputation with peers.117  
                                                 
115 For a discussion of the role of informal sanctions in a domestic setting, see, for example, Bruce A. Green and Fred 
C. Zacharias, ‘Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics’ (2002) 55 Vanderbilt L Rev 381, 405, 472 (discussing informal 
sanctions by judges); Kay L. Levine and Ronald F. Wright, ‘Prosecution in 3-D’ (2012) 102 J Crim L & Criminology 
1119 (discussing informal instruction by fellow prosecutors); Darryl K. Brown, ‘Criminal Procedure Entitlements, 
Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms’ (2000) 61 Ohio State LJ 801, 812 (discussing the limited ability of defense 
attorneys to impose informal sanctions on prosecutors). 
116 See W. Bradley Wendel, ‘Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities’ 
(2001) 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1955, 1955. 
117 ibid at 2042. 
29 
 
At least at present, informal sanctions are less likely to be a significant source of 
regulation at the ICC. The ICC’s legal community is both very diverse and transient, and 
consensus on governing professional norms has yet to emerge. But because social norms are 
likely to become more influential as the ICC matures, it is important to examine their potential 
usefulness in policing prosecutorial actions. 
A great deal of informal regulation is likely to occur within the Office of the Prosecution 
itself. Conversations in the corridor and discussions over lunch can help impart codes of 
professional conduct.118 By virtue of their experience and status, senior prosecutors can set 
standards particularly effectively, and this type of peer assessment can work well in cases 
where the errors result from inexperience or incompetence. Like formal internal sanctions, 
however, informal regulation within the Office of the Prosecutor is less apt to address systemic 
misconduct. Such misconduct becomes pervasive precisely because it is condoned or at least 
neglected by leaders of the Office, so internal regulation—whether formal or informal—is likely 
to be ineffectual in such cases. 
Defense attorneys can also indirectly influence prosecutorial conduct through informal 
channels. They may, for example, spread negative gossip about prosecutors whom they 
perceive as overly aggressive or unprofessional, and they may refuse to cooperate on 
scheduling requests, deadline extensions, and procedural waivers.119 But as in the domestic 
setting, international criminal defense attorneys have no significant leverage over the outcome 
of cases or over formal sanctions on prosecutors, and this limits their ability to apply informal 
pressure on prosecutors. The influence of defense attorneys is likely to be minimal for other 
reasons as well. At least at this time, personal interaction between defense and prosecution 
lawyers at the ICC tends to be limited to the courtroom. While prosecutors frequently interact 
socially with one another, with prosecutors from other international tribunals, and with 
members of the Chambers, they do not tend to socialize as often with defense attorneys.120 
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Defense attorneys are in The Hague only part-time, since they have to attend to other cases in 
their domestic practice; professional divisions likely further diminish social interactions with 
prosecutors. Even dealings within the court are frequently limited to one case, reducing the 
“repeat-player” effect that may lead prosecutors to cooperate with defense attorneys in 
domestic settings.121 Finally, ICC prosecutors rarely trade places with international criminal 
defense attorneys during their professional career. This further reduces their incentives to 
maintain friendly relations with the defense. For all these reasons, defense attorneys are not 
well-situated to influence prosecutors informally. In many cases, defense attorneys may also not 
even attempt to apply any social pressure on prosecutors. Defense attorneys are ethically bound 
to place their clients’ interests first, and they may perceive that the risk of antagonizing 
prosecutors conflicts with the duty to serve their clients in a particular case. 122  
ICC judges are likely to be more effective in sanctioning prosecutors informally. They 
can admonish a prosecutor off the record, relate improper conduct to a prosecutor’s superior, 
make scheduling decisions inconvenient to the misbehaving prosecutor, demand additional 
written submissions from prosecutors who act unprofessionally, and make the courtroom 
experience of a prosecutor unpleasant in various other ways.123 Because ICC judges in general 
wield broad authority over the outcome of a case (to a greater degree than judges in common-
law jurisdictions, for example124) and because they can impose formal sanctions for misconduct, 
their informal reprimands are likely to be taken seriously by ICC prosecutors. Judges at the ICC 
have shown that they are eager to use both formal and informal means to encourage 
prosecutors to adopt certain standards of professional conduct, although it is too early to assess 
the effectiveness of these sanctions.125   
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Judges’ ability to apply informal sanctions is not unlimited, however. The effect of such 
sanctions is likely to be felt primarily by the individual prosecutor working on the case. 
Informal sanctions are not publicized and for that reason would not be the optimal means of 
addressing a pattern of misconduct in the Office of the Prosecutor.126 Moreover, the ICC is 
generally a “far less structured social system” than a domestic criminal justice community.127 
Both prosecutors and judges are typically at the ICC for only a short time. Judges’ terms are 
limited to nine years.128 Prosecutors frequently work on only one ICC case and then return 
either to domestic practice or move on to a different international institution.129 As international 
court practitioners themselves have commented, this reduces the pressure to please judges.130 A 
bad reputation internationally does not necessarily “trickle[] down into a domestic practice that 
is separate in geography, community, and law.”131 
More broadly, until a more solid consensus develops on the applicable norms of 
professional conduct at the ICC, informal sanctions are likely to remain a week constraint on 
prosecutorial actions. Unlike in local legal communities, where “internalized standards of 
professional conduct . . . are written in the hearts and minds of each lawyer,” ICC lawyers come 
from diverse legal traditions and cultures and do not yet share a common understanding of 
professional norms.132 The lack of a formal code of conduct for prosecutors and the rapid 
turnover of lawyers and judges at the ICC also contribute to the problem. In the near future, 
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therefore, the ICC will have to continue to rely primarily on formal rules and methods of 
policing misconduct. But as the ICC develops its own set of identifiable and harmonized ethical 
norms and expectations, informal sanctioning will become a more potent source of regulating 
prosecutorial conduct, as it has been in domestic settings. 
D. Preventive Measures 
While the discussion so far has focused on measures responding to misconduct after the 
fact, the ICC can also benefit from developing structures that prevent misconduct from 
occurring in the first place. An important element of prevention is the establishment of a set of 
shared norms of professional conduct. Commentators had long argued that the Prosecutor must 
adopt a Code of Conduct to guide its prosecutors.133 In both common-law and civil-law systems, 
formal rules and codes of ethics serve as a critical ex ante constraint on prosecutorial actions.134 
They are even more necessary in a pluralist legal culture such as the ICC, where wide 
disagreement about the applicable norms persists. The formulation of a code of conduct could 
help deter misconduct before the fact and ensure fair punishment after misconduct occurs.  
 For more than ten years, however, the Office had failed to promulgate such a Code, 
even though similar Codes were adopted for defense attorneys, victim’s representatives and 
judges. The Office argued that the Rules of the Court, Staff Rules, and the OTP Operations 
Manual provide sufficient guidance for prosecutors. In September 2013, the Office finally 
adopted a Code of Conduct, perhaps in response to a judicial nudge. In May 2013, acting under 
its authority to ensure a fair trial, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kenyatta ordered the 
prosecution to follow several provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, 
which formally applies only to defense counsel, counsel for States, amici curiae, and counsel or 
legal representatives for victims and witnesses.135 The Chamber acknowledged that its order is 
limited only to the case before it and that only the Office of the Prosecution can promulgate a 
more broadly applicable Code of Conduct for ICC prosecutors. While it was limited to one case, 
                                                 
133 Markovic (n 31). 
134 Wright and Miller (n 2) 1601. 
135 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Defence Application Concerning Professional 
Ethics Applicable to Prosecution Lawyers ¶¶ 13-16 (May 31, 2013). 
33 
 
the Chamber’s decision to impose the defense Code of Conduct provisions to prosecutors in 
Kenyatta sent a clear signal that greater ethical regulation of ICC prosecutors is needed. The 
adoption of the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor helps address this concern and 
is a positive development towards accountability and transparency. 
The Office of the Prosecutor can do more to prevent misconduct by adopting additional 
training and monitoring programs for its lawyers. These features--“training, articulated 
standards, internal review of individual decisions and writing-based processes”—are a staple of 
civil-law systems’ accountability frameworks for prosecutors, and they are increasingly being 
considered by common-law systems as a means of preventing misconduct.136 They help reduce 
misconduct not only by clarifying the applicable rules, but also by “strengthen[ing] the concept 
of the prosecutor’s job as a neutral quasi-judicial officer” rather than a partisan advocate.137  
The Office of the Prosecutor has not clarified what training and internal review 
programs it has put in place to prevent misconduct, and the recent failure to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence in Kenyatta exposed certain flaws in its internal processes.138 But the most 
recent Strategic Plan unveiled by the Prosecutor in October 2013 suggests that the new 
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is aware of the need to address this problem and is taking steps in 
that direction. The Plan sets out a concrete goal of revising training programs and evidence 
disclosure practices, and it avows that the Office will pay “increased attention to proper 
performance management and an increased provision of training.”139 If the Office fails to follow 
through on these commitments to prevent misconduct, judges can again use their sanctioning 
powers to encourage the Office to adopt specific compliance programs.140 Given the high cost of 
imposing remedies for misconduct after the fact, it is critical for the Court to develop more 
effective prophylactic measures. 
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Soon after the ICC encountered prosecutorial errors and misconduct in its first case, it 
became clear that the Court could not rely exclusively on the Office of the Prosecutor to oversee 
the conduct of its members. In an important early accomplishment, ICC judges asserted an 
active role in sanctioning prosecutorial misconduct, imposing bold and sometimes drastic 
remedies. These early decisions were an important expression of the Court’s commitment to the 
rule of law and fair trial rights. Over time, however, the Court recognized that remedies must 
be calibrated in order to account for other important goals of the international criminal justice 
system, such as retribution, deterrence, and the establishment of an accurate historical record. 
Trial and Appeals Chambers began relying on a balancing approach to remedies and articulated 
some of the factors that would guide it. 
Going forward, the ICC will undoubtedly continue to rely greatly on judicial 
intervention to address prosecutorial misconduct. Judges are often the first to observe ethical 
and procedural violations by prosecutors, and they have the legal authority to impose sanctions 
and remedies to ensure the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.141  But judicial remedies 
can be too blunt and interfere with legitimate interests of the ICC in completing proceedings on 
the merits. Conversely, remedies can be too narrow; they often respond merely to the specific 
instance of misconduct before the Court and may not be well-suited to addressing systemic 
violations. Commentators have therefore begun turning their attention to other mechanisms 
that could provide more comprehensive oversight of prosecutorial actions. These include the 
Assembly of States Parties, the Independent Oversight Mechanism, bar associations, and the 
Office of the Prosecutor itself.  
These mechanisms have the potential to address systematic violations by the Office of 
the Prosecutor without imposing undue burdens on ongoing judicial proceedings. Yet they also 
carry distinct risks. Internal oversight is not likely to correct violations that are tolerated, 
explicitly or implicitly, by the leadership of the Office of the Prosecutor. Discipline by the 
Assembly and the Independent Oversight Mechanism, on the other hand, can be misused for 
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political reasons. More broadly, the multiplication of oversight mechanisms may lead to 
duplicative and inefficient inquiries, which impose unnecessary burdens on prosecutors, calling 
them to account too frequently and distracting them from their primary tasks of investigating 
and prosecuting international crimes. Conversely, the diffusion of regulatory responsibility may 
undermine efforts to hold prosecutors accountable, as each institution presumes that another 
will respond to an instance of misconduct.142  
To avoid these risks and ensure that the system functions effectively, the Court could 
develop mechanisms to coordinate the tasks of judicial, political and administrative 
authorities.143 The Court could draft a protocol that outlines when judges should take the lead in 
sanctioning misconduct and when they should refer cases for investigation and discipline to the 
Assembly, the IOM, or the Office of the Prosecutor. As discussed earlier, the Court may adopt a 
presumption that judges focus on misconduct that prejudices the defendant or the integrity of 
the proceedings, while non-judicial mechanisms address other cases. In some cases of systemic 
misconduct, both a judicial and an administrative response may necessary. When investigations 
of misconduct are undertaken by the Assembly or the IOM, a procedure that relies on judicial 
referrals can help minimize the risk of politicization. As foreseen in the ICC Statute, the Office 
of the Prosecutor would likely continue to have the primary responsibility to prevent 
misconduct—by drafting a Code of Conduct, instituting more regular training sessions, and 
improving its system of internal supervision. But judges may use their disciplinary powers to 
prompt the Office of the Prosecutor to take additional preventive steps when there is evidence 
that existing measures are inadequate. As the ICC’s accountability framework matures, the 
Court will be well-served by a coordinated approach that is led by the judges, yet assisted by 
other authorities, such as the Assembly of States Parties, the Independent Oversight 
Mechanism, and the Office of the Prosecutor.  
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